The modern world is not becoming safer. Against the backdrop of ever-new crises and conflicts, the need to deepen international cooperation for their prevention and resolution is only increasing, and does so with each passing day. Challenges and threats to both national and international security continue to multiply, stemming from multilayered sources of both internal and external origin. Despite appeals by the United Nations (UN), influential actors in practice pursue their own interests, while the UN itself has lost its former authority. The security architecture continues to deteriorate rapidly, even as information and communication technologies advance and various terrorist and extremist organizations intensify their activities — potentially gaining access, including to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Not only is the danger of further nuclear proliferation becoming more acute — as, for example, the United States tends to emphasize with regard to Iran, or Russia, which has repeatedly referred to the possibility of Ukraine acquiring a “dirty” nuclear bomb or receiving such weapons from its opponents in the Ukrainian issue, namely France or the United Kingdom — but so too is the risk associated with other types of such weapons. During the same Ukrainian conflict, the Russian side repeatedly drew close attention to the activities of U.S. biological laboratories on the territory of Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, as well as to their negative consequences. The recent coronavirus pandemic and its enormous death toll should have further convinced humanity of the need to develop and implement new effective mechanisms of oversight in the sphere of states’ military-biological activities, or to improve those already in place.

The problem lies in the fact that, in practice, one can essentially appeal only to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) — the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction — approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1971, signed in 1972, and entering into force in 1975. The Convention marks the culmination of international efforts to limit and prohibit biological weapons, introducing for the first time in history a comprehensive ban on them (covering use, development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer, etc.). However, the mechanisms provided for in Articles V–VII of the Convention are largely consultative and coordinative in nature, while the primary role in ensuring appropriate measures is assigned to the UN Security Council. The current alignment in relations among its permanent members has drastically reduced the possibility of reaching agreed decisions on its behalf. Moreover, the Convention did not establish a mechanism for monitoring compliance or verifying the fulfillment by states of their obligations. Serious difficulties arise in qualifying violations of the BTWC due to the rapid development and convergence of the biological and chemical sciences, as well as the dual-use potential of microbiological agents. Despite efforts undertaken in the 1990s and early 21st century to create a verification mechanism (including the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX), a voluntary working capital fund to stabilize the financial situation within the framework of the Convention, the adoption of a Protocol to the BTWC, codes of conduct for scientists, and others), the situation in this area remains highly complex. States engaged in active military-biological activities do not always support new initiatives aimed at strengthening the BTWC regime. For example, the United States refused to adopt the 2001 Protocol to the Convention and has effectively remained outside the framework of mutual oversight. Israel did not sign the 1972 Convention, and its policy is acquiring an increasingly expansionist character.

Meanwhile, the lessons of history demonstrate that only through unity and the overcoming of prior differences can the struggle against a common enemy be successful. A telling example is the anti-Hitler coalition during the years of World War II. It should also be recalled that its adversaries carried out large-scale efforts to develop biological weapons and conducted inhumane experiments involving their use. This applies прежде всего to Nazi Germany (including the Ozarichi concentration camp complex on the territory of present-day Belarus, the Dachau concentration camp in Germany, and Auschwitz in Poland, among others) and militarist Japan (Units 731 and 100, among others). These barbaric experiments were reflected in the materials of the Nuremberg Trials, the Tokyo Trials, and the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, though not in full, and many of their organizers and perpetrators managed to evade responsibility.

At present, military-biological activities are being infused with new content under the influence of scientific and technological progress, and are expanding geographically, as leaders in this field pursue extensive geopolitical interests. Major powers (the United States, China, and Russia) are conducting comprehensive research encompassing a wide range of activities — from infection monitoring to dual-use research. An additional danger lies in the existence of so-called covert research, where results are concealed from both domestic and international audiences. Such accusations are directed primarily at the United States. This includes, among other things, “biological espionage,” concerns about which have been expressed, in particular, by China. The exact number of high-containment laboratory complexes is being withheld, and serious violations of requirements for handling especially dangerous pathogens are occurring. Modeling of “natural evolutionary processes” is being employed, during which pathogens characterized by particular danger to humans have reportedly been obtained experimentally: highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1, pandemic swine influenza A/H1N1, botulinum toxin BoNT/H, and others. Reference is made to the involvement of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) — the curator of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) — as well as certain other agencies.

The National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories at Boston University is one of thirteen biosafety level-4 laboratories in the United States. Other such facilities are located in Texas, Atlanta, and Manhattan, Kansas. Many research projects are funded by the U.S. government under the Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen Research (ePPP) program. At the same time, it must be noted that there is a de facto absence in the United States of a comprehensive system of state oversight for R&D in the fields of genetic engineering and synthetic biology. At the very least, a number of high-profile cases (involving the “Boston strain” and the “Wuhan” variant) revealed a lack of any notable response from the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which initially attempted to initiate an investigation into the activities of the leadership of Boston University. Experiments at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (PRC) were also conducted within the framework of the U.S. ePPP program, with funding channeled through the non-governmental organization EcoHealth Alliance (New York). Of particular interest is its program “Establishing Biosurveillance Networks in Western Asia.”

It should also be recalled that the United States accused the Chinese side of a leak from the Wuhan laboratory. Donald Trump, already during his first presidential term, actively promoted the “Chinese” version of the origin of the coronavirus. However, at the beginning of his second term, Trump signed an executive order prohibiting federal funding for “dangerous gain-of-function research without adequate oversight” in China, Iran, and other countries. U.S. research agencies have been granted the authority to identify and terminate funding for biological research that could threaten “public health, public safety, or the national security of the United States.” Despite this, the United States maintains the largest network of biological laboratories outside its own territory. As noted earlier, concerns in this regard have been expressed by representatives of Russia and China. Many such laboratories are located along the perimeter of their borders or in close proximity — more broadly, within the spheres of their primary interests (the CIS region, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Asia). For these states, not only the direct risk of biological contamination may be articulated — including risks for the populations of the “host” countries — but also broader geopolitical challenges. The wording on the website of a subdivision of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in Georgia, intended to support the objectives of the U.S. Embassy, is noteworthy; among these objectives is Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, the Eurasian office of DTRA at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi serves as a regional hub, coordinating the activities of DTRA forward offices not only in Georgia but also in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Within Georgia itself, the following programs are being implemented: the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD PPP), the International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management. These programs are carried out in partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, in close cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, as well as the U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. The list of partners itself invites reflection.

Thus, military-biological activities — both in historical retrospect and in the present — can be assessed as highly risky and often extending beyond the bounds of international legal norms and regimes. They contain a significant ethical dimension, which, however, is far from being taken into account by all actors. The experiments conducted by German Nazis and Japanese militarists have left a dark stain on history. Today, residents of countries hosting foreign biological laboratories face security threats, including those arising from leaks of dangerous pathogens. At the same time, relations among great powers generate grounds for mutual accusations, information manipulation, and the discrediting of strategic adversaries. This, of course, does not contribute to the formation of even a minimal level of mutual trust necessary for a new round of negotiations on adapting the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to changing realities. In turn, this provokes new international disputes, a deterioration of the international environment, and the further erosion of the force of law as an essential instrument for ensuring international stability and security.

Biological research undoubtedly holds immense value for human health and for the survival of humanity as a whole. However, military-biological activities must be subject to far more effective oversight. In this regard, several possible scenarios for future developments may be envisaged:

●        further modernization of the BTWC regime based on incorporating the full range of proposals previously and still being put forward by states from different regions of the world (India, China, Russia, France, Switzerland, South Africa, among others); in this case, the primary platform would be the UN Security Council, however, its effective functioning would require the resumption of dialogue among its members, with the necessary preconditions lying прежде всего in the settlement of the Middle Eastern, Ukrainian, and other acute crises, and in the alignment of interests at least on the most fundamental issues;

●        the activation of regional institutions whose mandates include, inter alia, security issues, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, NATO, European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN, and the Organization of American States; at the same time, both individually and within their frameworks, there currently exist significant shortcomings, gaps, and disagreements that hinder consensus among participants; substantial refinement of conceptual, legal foundations and instruments is required;

●        the concentration of efforts on the bilateral track, along the lines of strategic partnerships (Russia–Belarus, Russia–China, United States–Israel, United States–United Kingdom, among others); this scenario is predicated on the persistence and even intensification of overall international instability and tensions;

●        the articulation of exclusivity and unilateralism, which aligns with attempts to construct a hierarchical world order and is likewise conceivable in a context of global disorder.

The first scenario appears the least likely, yet the most preferable. Most likely, however, the trajectory of international cooperation in this sphere will be of a mixed nature, integrating several of these options. It appears that the regional and bilateral tracks, in light of the current balance of power, alignment of interests, and the specific features of the BTWC regime, offer the most viable set of opportunities and will be regarded by the major powers as priorities in shaping their foreign policy behavior.

ANO UNITED WORLD