By March 2026, the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran had moved from a phase of “managed confrontation” – characterized by sanctions, strikes on proxy forces, covert operations, and occasional episodes of direct exchanges of fire – into the format of an open regional war. On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale aerial campaign against targets on Iranian territory. Iranian state media confirmed the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, while Washington and Jerusalem stated that the operation was aimed at neutralizing threats and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

A distinctive feature of the current escalation is that it was triggered not by a single localized flare-up on the periphery, but by a combination of several factors. These include the failed attempt to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue – negotiations in Geneva in late February 2026 produced no results – the “infrastructure of war” accumulated during previous crises (networks of allied groups and bases, logistics for missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and instruments for exerting pressure on global trade), as well as internal political dynamics within the participating countries themselves.

At the same time, Russia and China, the European allies of the United States, the states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s neighboring countries are being forced to act under conditions of a rapidly expanding geography of risk. In the very first days of the conflict, Iran carried out missile and drone strikes not only against Israel but also against several countries in the region where United States forces and key transport hubs are located. This qualitatively distinguishes the current situation from many previous crises, when the “center of gravity” remained in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, or the Gaza Strip.

Finally, the current escalation carries a systemic risk of “spillover” beyond the Middle East through two main channels. The first concerns energy and maritime communications. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical global chokepoints for oil and liquefied natural gas, and any restrictions on shipping immediately affect prices, logistics, and inflation worldwide. The second channel involves the potential involvement of additional states through strikes on their territory, infrastructure, or facilities hosting foreign military contingents. An example of this has been the interception of Iranian ballistic missiles over Turkey by NATO air defense systems, as well as incidents reported in the South Caucasus.

The Main Causes of the Confrontation

The key underlying cause remains Iran’s nuclear program and the conflicting interpretations surrounding its objectives. On the one hand, Iran insists on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. On the other hand, Western countries and Israel have for many years viewed the accumulation of highly enriched uranium and the development of delivery systems as a pathway toward a “threshold” nuclear status.

The second set of causes lies in the “proxy architecture” and the logic of mutual deterrence through allied actors. For decades, Iran has built a network of partners and supported armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and other parts of the region. Israel and the United States, in turn, have sought to deprive this network of the capability to carry out strikes against their territory and their facilities.

The third factor is the struggle for regional influence and control over the Middle East’s “geoeconomic” landscape, including the routes for hydrocarbon exports, maritime corridors, and the fundamental security of trade.

Finally, domestic politics also plays an important role. In the United States, according to Reuters, a debate was underway within the administration of Donald Trump between proponents of a “quick victory” and those who favored continuing pressure. The economic bloc warned about the political cost of a potential fuel shock ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, while the “hawks” insisted on a tougher line toward Iran. In Iran, the escalation has coincided with a recent wave of internal instability and the introduction of strict security measures, which has increased the regime’s motivation to demonstrate resilience and the ability to inflict retaliatory damage.

The Current Situation and Factors Increasing the Risk of Escalation

The war that began on February 28, 2026, quickly assumed a multi-front character. In its initial phase, the United States and Israel announced large-scale strikes on Iranian targets. According to Reuters, on the first day alone the Israeli Air Force deployed about 200 aircraft and attacked hundreds of targets. Iran responded with mass launches of missiles and drones against Israel and several countries in the region where United States bases are located. By mid-March 2026, according to Reuters reports, as the conflict approached its third week, the death toll had exceeded two thousand, while the sides continued to exchange mutual threats.

One of the main drivers of escalation has been the involvement of Iran’s allies and the gradual spread of hostilities. According to Reuters, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-backed groups intensified both their strikes and their coordination. In Lebanon, Hezbollah carried out massive rocket attacks, after which Israel expanded its operations, including strikes on infrastructure and the enlargement of evacuation zones. Lebanese authorities reported hundreds of deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. In Iraq, Iranian-aligned groups increased the use of drones and rockets. Separate incidents included attacks on facilities associated with the United States and its partners, including a drone strike on a major United States diplomatic compound which, according to Reuters, caused no casualties.

A critical factor in the escalation is the threat to maritime trade routes and energy supplies. In the first days of the conflict, Iran declared the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and subsequent incidents included attacks on civilian vessels. Reuters, citing analytical organizations such as the Institute for the Study of War and the AEI Critical Threats Project, reported attacks on sixteen civilian ships. Iranian structures warned that vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz could become targets. At the same time, the International Energy Agency reported what it described as the “largest supply disruption in history.” In its March Oil Market Report, the agency indicated that flows through the Strait of Hormuz had fallen from roughly twenty million barrels per day to what it called a “thin trickle,” while Gulf countries reduced production by at least ten million barrels per day. Member states of the International Energy Agency agreed to release a record four hundred million barrels from strategic reserves in order to stabilize the market.

Finally, the war is producing severe “secondary effects,” including environmental and humanitarian consequences. Reuters, for example, reported strikes on fuel facilities in the Tehran area that resulted in the formation of toxic smoke clouds, as well as the risk of acid precipitation and threats to public health, about which Iranian authorities and humanitarian organizations have issued warnings. Even Pakistan, according to Reuters, noted the possibility that pollutants could be carried across borders by prevailing winds.

Possible Scenarios for the Development of the Conflict

In practice, the scenarios depend on whether the parties are able to “shift” the war back into a mode of limited confrontation, or whether it will continue to expand in terms of geography and the number of actors involved.

The first scenario is de-escalation and a ceasefire mediated by third countries and international organizations, in which the parties consolidate “minimally acceptable” outcomes and move toward a negotiation-based format. The likelihood of such an outcome is supported by economic incentives – including an oil shock, inflation, and pressure from financial markets – as well as by domestic political constraints.

The second scenario is a prolonged limited war without a large-scale ground operation, but with the continuation of air strikes and attacks on maritime trade. Under this scenario, Iran would likely rely on asymmetric instruments – including drones, missiles, pressure through the strait, and attacks on shipping – while the United States and Israel would focus on intensive strikes against military capabilities and critical infrastructure.

The third scenario is a regional war “involving several states,” in which proxy fronts evolve into full-fledged theaters of war and strikes on the territory of neighboring countries become routine. A potential “threshold moment” in this scenario is linked to several flashpoints. One is Azerbaijan, particularly the confrontation surrounding the Zangezur corridor and rising tensions along the Iranian–Azerbaijani border. Another is Yemen, where the entry of the Houthi movement into the conflict could intensify pressure on oil logistics and global trade routes. A third factor concerns Turkey: there have already been repeated interceptions of Iranian ballistic missiles over Turkish territory by NATO air defense systems.

The Risk of the Involvement of New Participants

In the current configuration of the conflict, there is a significant likelihood that its geography will expand through the involvement of “new participants” in three ways: through strikes on their territory – whether as a result of targeting errors, missile overflights, or drone attacks – through the presence of military bases and allied security commitments, and through threats to critical infrastructure and trade.

In practice, the states of the Persian Gulf are already indirectly involved, as United States facilities are located on their territory and a significant share of global energy logistics passes through them. From the first days of the conflict, Iran carried out strikes on targets in several of these countries, while the International Energy Agency recorded forced production cuts by Gulf states due to disruptions in exports. Iraq and Lebanon have also become active zones of hostilities. In Iraq, drone attacks on United States facilities and the presence of coalition partners have been reported. In Lebanon, the scale of fighting and the expansion of evacuation zones have reached levels affecting a substantial portion of the country’s territory. Turkey has found itself in a “gray zone” between its desire to avoid escalation and the fact that NATO air defense systems have intercepted missiles over its territory. One of the incidents was accompanied by explosions near the area of the Incirlik Air Base.

A separate mechanism for a potential “chain reaction” is the presence of foreign military bases and warnings about possible strikes against them. According to Reuters, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has emphasized in his rhetoric that neighboring countries should close United States bases located on their territory, otherwise they risk becoming targets. Under such conditions, even a single successful strike on a United States or allied facility – or mass casualties among personnel – could trigger a rapid escalation spiral.

In addition, the South Caucasus is becoming one of the most sensitive potential frontiers for the expansion of the war. The region is geographically close to Iran, closely connected to key energy infrastructures, and burdened with its own unresolved conflicts and transportation disputes.

On March 5, 2026, Baku reported that four people were injured in the Nakhchivan exclave as a result of a drone strike that the Azerbaijani side linked to Iran. President Ilham Aliyev announced preparations for retaliatory measures, while Tehran denied any involvement. The following day, Azerbaijan announced the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, including personnel from the consulate in Tabriz – the largest city in northwestern Iran, where a significant number of ethnic Azerbaijanis reside. On March 7, 2026, Azerbaijan also stated that it had prevented several acts of sabotage that it associated with planning by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These reportedly included a planned attack on the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as plots targeting Israeli and Jewish facilities in Azerbaijan.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that for the United States and Israel, the involvement of Azerbaijan in the existing conflict may represent a certain strategic interest, as this could increase the chances of bringing the war to a quicker conclusion on terms favorable to Washington. Statements by the Azerbaijani leadership that are perceived as provocative, the factors of Azerbaijan’s military-technical and economic ties with Israel, and the possible role of Azerbaijani bases in scenarios involving strikes against Iran may all be taken into consideration in Tehran’s calculations. In addition, the issue of the “Zangezur corridor” must also be considered. This refers to the proposed route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik region. The question remains contentious: Armenia opposes the idea of an extraterritorial regime for the corridor, while Iran has publicly objected to the logic of such a “corridor,” fearing the loss of its key land link with Armenia and the emergence of external control near its borders. According to a number of analytical assessments, Iran’s weakening as a result of the war could encourage Baku to intensify pressure on the transport issue, framing it as part of a broader vision associated with the concept of a “Unified Azerbaijan.”

However, in the event of further escalation – accompanied by attempts by the United States to draw Azerbaijan into confrontation with Iran – there is a risk of destabilizing the situation in the Caucasus region and intensifying interconfessional tensions in the Islamic world. Iranian air strikes against Azerbaijan in such an escalation scenario could lead to significant civilian casualties and cause serious economic damage.

In addition, there is a possibility that other countries may become involved in the conflict. Turkey is balancing between its status as a NATO member and the need to avoid a direct war, but it has already faced the overflight and interception of Iranian ballistic missiles above its territory, including incidents near the area of the Incirlik Air Base. The states of the Persian Gulf risk deeper involvement because of the presence of United States military facilities and the vulnerability of oil infrastructure, particularly amid declining flows through the Strait of Hormuz and reductions in production. Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq have already become de facto theaters of interconnected military activity, where proxy groups and foreign contingents are becoming targets of strikes, creating the risk of unintended expansion of the war. Pakistan could also become a factor if environmental and humanitarian conditions near its borders deteriorate and pressure on regional security increases. Russia, China, the European Union, and NATO function as external “centers of gravity” through diplomacy, sanctions, and energy markets, which increases the likelihood that the conflict could evolve into a broader international crisis.

Possible Consequences of the Expansion of the Conflict

The expansion of the conflict would lead to a sharp increase in humanitarian pressures, large-scale population displacement, and a growing political fragility of states across the region – trends that are already visible in Lebanon and in the risks facing Iraq. The primary economic impact is concentrated in the energy sector. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has described the situation as the largest supply shock in history and has initiated a record release of four hundred million barrels from strategic reserves. However, this measure can serve only as a temporary stabilizing mechanism. Volatility in oil markets and fears surrounding maritime shipping are quickly transmitted to the global economy through inflation, rising logistics costs, and increased political pressure on governments. Reuters has also noted these effects in its reporting on market reactions and domestic political debates in the United States. At the international level, broader geopolitical competition is intensifying – from disputes in the United Nations Security Council to decisions regarding sanctions regimes affecting the oil market, which also influence relations among allies. An additional risk concerns environmental and long-term public health consequences resulting from strikes on fuel infrastructure, including the formation of toxic clouds and the potential for acid precipitation over major metropolitan areas.

Сonclusion

The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran in the spring of 2026 represents one of the most dangerous and systemically significant crises of the present era, as it combines direct warfare, a nuclear dimension, and a multi-front structure involving allied actors. The principal threat lies not only in the continued exchange of strikes but also in the gradual involvement of additional states. The South Caucasus and Azerbaijan are already experiencing the “expansion effect” – from the drone incident in Nakhchivan to statements about prevented acts of sabotage targeting pipeline and diplomatic infrastructure. Any further escalation around the Strait of Hormuz would effectively globalize the economic dimension of the war, thereby increasing the likelihood of intensified external pressure and the emergence of new lines of confrontation.