The Twelve-Day War has marked a before and after in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The new multipolar order that Russia and China aim to create has been preserved with the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this conflict has revealed two ways of viewing the Middle East.

Many proclaim victory, but in this article, we will analyze the reasons why Iran has won and Israel has not. We will distinguish between Israel’s tactical victory and Iran’s strategic victory—concepts that are very different. Many claim Israel’s victory, but if that were true, it would be a Pyrrhic victory whose benefits are negligible when considering the geopolitical losses.

It is true that Israel demonstrated clear air superiority; its ability to penetrate Iranian airspace was total, and Mossad’s capabilities were confirmed once again. Israel’s secret services—Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman—are among the best in the world.

The first blow was devastating: Israel’s aerial and intelligence superiority surprise-dismantled Iran’s air defenses (reminiscent of the Six-Day War), took out the Supreme Leader of the Sepah Pasdaran, and targeted military bases and administration.

However, these attacked military facilities were located in the west of Iran, while Israeli penetration in the east was minimal. Notably, attacks on major nuclear sites (Natanz, Fordow, Esfahan) occurred, but many other facilities remain operational.

Iran’s response was unexpected. Its missile capability, contrasting with its outdated air force composed of F-14s and Su-27s, allowed it to impact Israeli territory and damage infrastructure in Tel Aviv and Haifa, a key port for the land logistics route from Oman to Haifa connecting India to the Mediterranean.

Iran’s resilience was demonstrated by its ability to withstand the sustained pressure, regenerate military command structures, and recover a significant part of its air defense within three days, enabling it to continue resisting Israel’s assaults.

Additionally, Iran’s nuclear negotiations, which were completely stalled due to Tehran’s outright refusal and its withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—similar to North Korea or Israel (which never joined)—constitute a strategic victory. This created instability comparable to the effect of closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which over 20% of the world’s oil passes. It caused markets to react by lowering prices for Western Texas Intermediate and Brent crude to offset the expected rise in Dubai crude, despite attempts by OPEC+ to match Iranian production levels before the war to weaken Iran’s economy.

This threat prompted China to divest from its $400 billion investments in Iran (which will now flow again peacefully) and made the U.S. take the long-term Iran-Israel conflict and U.S. involvement seriously.

Furthermore, Iran realized that its global alliances—Russia and China—acted within diplomatic lines, without grand declarations or interventions like those of Trump or Macron, yet they continued to support Iran—as always In fact. Putin wanted to develop a joint air defense system, which Iran rejected, and they have always helped Iran with nuclear technology.

Thus, Iran capitalized on its geopolitical position within the multipolar world, its missile capability, and its strategic location to pursue an effective stance. Pakistan, Iraq, and North Korea openly sided with Iran and provided assistance.

However, Iran’s strategic victory isn’t solely based on its ability to strike Israel (which succeeded in intimidating Israeli society) or to keep the international community on edge due to the Strait of Hormuz closing—or potentially the Bab el-Mandeb strait via the Houthis.

It also highlighted the generally favorable position of Azerbaijan toward Israel and the support for Iran from countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Another significant factor for Iran’s victory is the withdrawal from the IAEA and its refusal to receive Director Grossi, a move that cannot be easily challenged given the organization’s role and current limitations. The IAEA failed to prevent the attack despite having provided favorable reports on Iran.

Without this international oversight, Iran enjoys greater freedom and agility in its actions. An additional reason for this success is Iran’s shift in perception regarding the Axis of Resistance.

The Axis of Resistance has proven to be ineffective; it neither attacked nor harmed Israel nor defended itself or Iran effectively. Their overall assessment is negative, except for the Houthis and Iraq.

In the Palestinian and Lebanese cases, the return on investment is negative: objectives are not achieved, economic costs are high, and diplomatic and geopolitical controversies arise, painting Iran as a supporter of terrorism. The Houthis cannot do more than they are already doing, and in Iraq, while there is strong intent, operational capacity is limited in this new phase of state-to-state conflict.

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In the war between terrorist militias such as DAESH – IS (ISIS), the axis militias are functioning, but it seems we are in a new episode. From my point of view, Iran should reconsider that structure, drastically reduce economic and military investment, and focus on the social and political aspects to turn these groups into lobbies and embed them into the political, economic, and media system. Simultaneously, they should integrate military elements within a centralized and state-controlled organization of the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement. Since these groups would no longer be foreign to Iran’s media, political, and social influence through lobbies and soft power, this approach would be much cheaper.

Some of the money saved could be reinvested in modernizing the Air Force, increasing budgets for civil and military infrastructure, enhancing R&D (Research and Development) in both military and civilian sectors, as well as increasing intelligence budgets, which, interestingly, should aim to resemble those of Israel as closely as possible.

Regarding intelligence services, the brutal attack revealed the extensive spy network and infiltrated forces in Iranian civilian, military, and intelligence organizations. The Israeli mindset of a quick defeat was shattered by Iran’s response, and the detection of the ongoing operation required significant intelligence resources. Even intercepted and leaked calls from Mossad officials to Iranian officials confirmed this. In response, Iran’s intelligence capabilities have been able to detect, investigate, and begin dismantling these networks, causing losses to Israel—especially among Kurdish and Baluchi groups—who, in this case, publicly stated they were waiting for orders from Israel to act. Iranian intelligence now has enough data to dismantle and severely damage Israel’s operational capabilities in the region.

On the other hand, the discourse from Trump, Netanyahu, and Reza Pahlavi—son of the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—called for sedition and protests against Khamenei for several days, but these protests did not materialize. Reza Pahlavi even presented his government plans, claimed to be in contact with Iranian generals interested in staging a coup, and called on the people to rise up, demanding Khamenei’s resignation and promising a fair trial.

Many opponents of the ayatollahs, seeing their country attacked—through classical war, hybrid warfare, intelligence operations, and such discourses—set aside their animosity toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and supported their country. They ignored these calls; in fact, Reza Pahlavi lost what little Iranian support he might have had and was accused of being a traitor and a sellout. In this sense, if under these circumstances—after such an attack involving classic war, hybrid tactics, intelligence operations, and political speeches—the Iranian society supported the state, the ayatollahs should realize that liberalizing society (within reasonable and logical limits, considering the socio-cultural context), on issues like the veil or internet access, would be positive and could enhance the feeling of victory. If Trump, Netanyahu, and Reza Pahlavi’s messages—in a war with bombs falling on Tehran—did not rally the people against Khamenei, then TikTok videos or social media posts won’t do it either.

In conclusion, Iran has remained resilient, suffered personal and military losses, but has not lost its nuclear program and has emerged politically and socially strengthened both domestically and internationally. Geopolitically, even against an Israel that failed to achieve its objectives—destroying Iran’s nuclear program and overthrowing Khamenei—Iran’s position has been reinforced.

However, this is not the end.