Iran Zamin (Part 2): Iranianism as a Geopolitical Axis

Iran Zamin (Part 3): The Anti-Western Bloc and Hispanic – American Resistance

In 1979, Iran changed course in the Middle East, moving from an Empire to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following an internal crisis that nearly led to a civil war and after the Iraq War, the Iranian government felt the need to design a strategy that would allow it to project itself in the region. This projection would have two main bases:

Religious Shi’ism and social Shi’ism

Shi’ism would be the foundation of the Iranian alliance in its international relations within the geopolitical spectrum of the Middle East. In the 1980s and 1990s, it could only implement this through the linkage of the Pasdaran and Basij with AMAL and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the only armed group that did not disarm following the Taif Agreements and that established a parallel state structure capable of displacing the weak Lebanese state.

This ensured a balance of power in Lebanon in the 1990s that allowed Tehran to focus on its important ally in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, there was Hafez al-Assad, a socialist and secular Syrian of Alawite origin, a minority branch of Shi’ism that exists almost exclusively in Syria but is the hard core of the Ba’ath Party in Syria, which was at odds with the predominantly Sunni and pan-Arabist Ba’ath Party of Iraq.

In fact, due to this reality, Hafez al-Assad always distrusted the Arab world, both the Gulf monarchies and the socialist Saddam Hussein, fearing betrayal or any direct or indirect attack through proxy allies. This meant that after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, the Damascus-Tehran relationship strengthened to the point that Syria sent volunteers to Iran to fight against the Iraqi troops.

In fact, the Syria-Iran tandem supported Hezbollah in Lebanon throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and until 2005, when Syria withdrew from Lebanon. From that moment on, Hezbollah was able to stand on its own, ultimately defeating Israel in 2006 but closely linked to Syria until 2024, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad. In a shift that anticipated iranian movements in the coming decade, it modified its manifesto and transitioned from being a Khomeinist militia for Lebanon to a secular republic, thereby opening its doors to Christians, Druze, and even Sunnis. Iran would do the same during the difficult decade of the 2010s to the present, seeking support among oppressed groups like Christians.

The process of the Shiite revolution, as seen in Iraq, truly consisted of, as Rafsanjani said, the claim for sovereignty and power by the majority of Iraqis, Shiites marginalized during the rule of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, the republican government, and the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. This resulted in Shiite power in Iraq and the triumph of Iran.

However, within the ideological Shi’ism of Iran, there existed a strong anti-Zionist, anti-Wahhabi, and anti-Salafist political current that provides an ideological block strength to these countries, which, albeit in a rushed manner, were forming and cooperating in the region through diplomatic engineering, support, commercial exchanges, geopolitical and financial ties, and intelligence sharing among different states in order to identify common enemies, detect them, combat them, and support allied structures.

We must also take into account the existence of sharia as a source and basis for the vision of Iranian public international law and its diplomatic relations. Islamic international law, or sharia, plays a crucial role in Iran’s international relations post-1979 revolution. As a source of legislation, sharia guides the political and diplomatic decisions of the country, defining its stance towards other actors in the Middle East and beyond.

Iran promotes an Islamic governance model that opposes the systems of many states in the region. This approach translates into support for groups and movements that share an Islamic philosophy, such as Hezbollah and various militias in Iraq and Syria. Sharia serves to justify these actions, framing the support in the defense of the ummah (Islamic community) and the interests of Muslims from a Shiite perspective.

Adherence to sharia also impacts Iranian diplomacy, enhancing its capacity to establish relations with countries that operate under different principles. In the international context, Iran uses sharia in its vision of international law (which we could refer to as the Iranian diplomatic school) to promote its foreign policy, presenting itself as an actor that defends Islamic principles against external influences in general, and against particular aggressions towards Shiites. This strategy allows it to articulate its role in regional geopolitics, seeking to strengthen its influence in an environment marked by conflicts and disputes.

In conclusion, sharia not only shapes the internal legal framework of Iran, but it is also a determining factor in its approach to international relations, influencing its behavior and alliances in a complex regional context.

Iran Zamin from 2000

The significant boost for the block conceived by Iran will come with the Iraq War of 2003 when Saddam Hussein is overthrown from power in Iraq. The power-sharing system devised by the United States after the end of Ba’athism sidelined the Sunnis (considered radicals from Al-Qaeda or crypto-Ba’athists), resulting in a greater share of power for the Shiites, led by Ali al-Sistani. The network initiated by Qassem Soleimani in 2002, which included militants, Pasdaran, intelligence, money, and support for the post-war period, managed to bolster the Shiite militias around Sistani’s messages and, to a lesser extent, those of Al-Sadr, who provides the ideological framework for the Shiite government in Baghdad. Al-Sadr’s position, always ambiguous, will ultimately be positive for Iran, as Al-Sadr, despite being an Arab nationalist resisting Iranian power, brings his Shiite supporters closer to Iran, albeit indirectly through Arab Shiite nationalism.

For the first time, Baghdad and Tehran share co-religionists and rulers. However, the milestone of 2003 will be reaffirmed by the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, in which the Lebanese Shiite militia will be able to deter Israel, gaining prestige and demonstrating that it is now a mature, independent militia with intelligence and military capabilities on par with the best organizations in the Middle East.

• Complete assistance to Syria in the form of sending militants and Pasdaran and Basij volunteers and taking positions in regions controlled by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with the goal of establishing a corridor from Iran to Syria through the strategic Al-Bukamal crossing and reaching Lebanon with Hezbollah. This allows Iran to mobilize financial and military resources in a dual strategy: to dominate the plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, enhance and advance its defense, and encircle its major enemy, Israel, from the north.

• The creation of ideologically stable pro-Iranian Shiite militias such as Liwa Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan (founded by Ali Reza Tavasooli of Hazara ethnicity) and Liwa Zainebiyoun from Pakistan (commanded by Haj Haider) deployed in Syria and Iraq;
• Promotion of local and regional militias: Kataib Imam Ali, Al Mahdi Army, Kataeb Hezbollah, Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Saraya al-Khorasani, Kataib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam, Saraya Ashura, Shabak Militia, which later formed a coalition of militias called: Popular Mobilization Forces with unified command and structure (following Sistani’s fatwa) and under the authority of the Prime Minister of Iraq (Shiite);
• Assistance to the militias of Yemen, especially the Ansarullah Movement (Houthis), through support in intelligence, technology, money, and combat training, investments that have resulted in a strong defense of the positions of the axis of resistance in the Arabian Peninsula, situated south of one of its two main rivals (Saudi Arabia, with which it shares a border) and with the control of Yemeni territorial waters under the custody of Ansarullah due to its possession of the coastline in one of the richest and busiest areas for fishing as well as for international transit, making Ansarullah’s position strategic;
• Sending intelligence and military officers to assist and plan operations in the region.

The militia strategy has an archetypal component in the conception of Persian expansion and is based on an embryo of the ancient administrative satrapies of the Achaemenids, Arsacids, and Sassanids, centered on the accommodation of a leader-governor with autonomy and their own military power who acts within their legitimacy but answers, if necessary, to a superior with the authority and power to demand assistance and support if needed, which implies the construction of an imperial system.

This pact of honor is what has allowed the Persian agenda in its geopolitical theory of Iran Zamin to be non-corrosive and not to erode the communities that have approached Tehran’s power due to the broad autonomy of its allies, as it does not fall into the chaotic jihadist model of decentralized cells (as seen in the Arab case), which can often backfire, nor into a strict bureaucratic order hierarchy as in the case of Turkey.

This will clearly demonstrate Iran’s power in the Middle East region, creating a stable and centralized block controlled by Seyyed Ali Khamenei in the form of «Primus Inter Pares» (or leader of leaders), under which the regional leaders in Lebanon (through Naim Qassem, heir to Hassan Nasrallah), Syria (Bashar al-Assad until 2024 and from 2025 the leaders of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, Eagles of the Whirlwind, Syrian Popular Resistance, Ba’athist Military Council for the Liberation of Syria, Ba’athist Coastal Shield Brigade of Syria), Iraq (Falih al-Fayyad, leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces under the control of the Prime Minister of Iraq, and Ahmad al-Hamidawi, Akram al-Kaabi, Qais Khazali, Abu Ala al-Walai, and Haydar Muzhir Ma’lak al-Sa’idi, leaders of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq), and Yemen (Abdelmalek al-Houthi) are under the decisive supervision of Iran, which, through the Pasdaran and VEVAK, maintains the entente.

In this case, the imperial model is supported by Seyyed Ali Khamenei and the coordinated «princes,» who are the modern leaders of this entente and are comfortable with it because only in cases of extreme necessity (such as in the wars in Syria, Gaza, or Yemen) must they perform duties subordinate to the general interest of the block, which, at the same time, responds to the general interests of Iran as the central axis of Tehran’s ideology, guaranteeing the existence of Shiite subcivilization against the Sunnis.

One must be able to understand that, although they have great military capacity in the field of asymmetric warfare, these structures are indeed political and social, with a strong ideological focus, organization, and a subsidiary structure to the state in which they reside. They also engage in charitable works that go beyond merely feeding the population; within the limitations of these contexts, they offer medical, educational, assistance, and security services that manage to attract many adherents.

In fact, the greatest proof of this linkage and network structure is found in the response to the Gaza War since October 2023. Following Hamas’s «Operation Al Aqsa Flood,» which aligned with the Shiite entente in 2017 (despite being a Sunni group), the Axis of Resistance has attacked Israel from Lebanon with coordinated strikes by Hezbollah and AMAL. In Yemen, the attacks by Ansarullah with rockets have impacted southern Israel, and maritime warfare actions have managed to dismantle international trade with Israeli origin, destination, and flag (which receives goods overland, beyond the capabilities of Ansarullah’s actions… for now. These goods are unloaded in Saudi or Emirati territories, crossing the Arabian Peninsula to Jordan and then going to Israel). Moreover, their allies have witnessed how their vessels (British or American) have been attacked and sunk in the region.

This does not account for the attacks on the presence of U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria by Iraqi militias and the Iranian army, which ultimately led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Conclusions

A whole block mobilized primarily by the linkage of socio-religious power and its ideological development through mosques and madrasas energized by powerful and charismatic religious leaders, but on a social level, energized by feelings of being the children of the oppressed Shiite nation that has awakened and the need to belong to a larger group capable of generating resources in the face of broken, corrupt, and incapable states.

The capacity of these groups to generate order, reestablish social harmony in post-conflict scenarios, and generate resources has created among young people and other Shiite volunteers, who may not have a particularly religious disposition, a sense of gratitude for the assistance received and the development of an identity-based Shi’ism through both religious and secular propaganda. This has transformed into a sociological Shi’ism based on patriotism and identity, which has reinforced Iran’s role at the regional level, the support it receives, and its ability to reach the masses, strengthening an Axis of Resistance and projecting the initial phases of a new Persian empire, Iran Zamin, despite the problems to the west of the Euphrates with the attacks on Hezbollah and the fall of Bashar al-Assad.